

THIRTY FIVE CENTS

OCTOBER 1958

# MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

## PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

C. WRIGHT MILLS

## AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

THE EDITORS

VOL. 10

6

*Marxism: Two Essays*

PAUL A. BARAN

• PAUL M. SWEEZY

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEEZY

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MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August when bimonthly, and copyright, ©1958, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 218 West 10th Street, New York 14, New York.  
Telephone: ORegon 5-6939.

MAILING ADDRESS: 66 Barrow Street, New York 14, New York.

Address ALL communications to 66 Barrow Street.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—\$4; two years—\$7.

By 1st class mail—United States \$6; everywhere else \$7.

By air mail—No. America \$8; So. America \$13; Europe \$17; Asia \$24.

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## NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

In connection with this month's Review of the Month ("American Policy in the Far East"), we would like to call your attention to an earlier and more detailed analysis of one aspect of that subject, namely, "What Every American Should Know about Formosa" which appeared in the March 1955 issue of MR. The editorial in question was an attempt to elucidate the background of the crisis which erupted over the Tachen islands in the winter of 1955. We believe that it will be found to be no less valuable in the context of the present Quemoy crisis. We still have a number of copies of the March 1955 issue in stock and will be glad to supply them on a first-come-first-served basis at 35 cents apiece or three for a dollar.

In the long run what happens in the Far East will be crucially influenced by the economic development of the new China. Last year, Monthly Review Press published what we believe is the first really comprehensive study of this subject in English, Solomon Adler's *The Chinese Economy*. Now Mr. Adler has collaborated with Joan Robinson, world renowned British economist, to write a tract for the Fabian Society entitled *China: An Economic Perspective*

(continued on inside back cover)

## AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

Last month we reviewed American policy in the Middle East, arguing that the dominant consideration in that part of the world is not the quest for military-strategic advantages in the cold war but rather the fabulous profits which flow from control over the Middle Eastern oilfields. This being the case, it follows that no mere change in political strategy—such, for example, as might come about if a new man were to replace Dulles as Secretary of State—would suffice to bring about a change in policy: what is required is nothing less than a new New Deal which would loosen the grip of the big corporations on the levers of power in Washington.

The situation in the Far East is different. Economically, the United States has relatively few interests in that area. No profits at all have been coming out of China for a long time, and realistically there is no prospect that this will change in the foreseeable future. True, there may still be people in this country who dream of exploiting Chinese labor or Chinese consumers, but this is not in the least comparable to the existence of billion-dollar corporations with enormous vested interests in the region. Moreover, most of those who run billion-dollar corporations are cautious and hard-headed enough not to want to stake their own or their country's existence on the dubious gamble that China can be turned into a source of future profit. It follows that America's Far Eastern policy, unlike its Middle Eastern policy, is *not* dominated by economic considerations: here military-strategic considerations definitely do hold sway.

The entire American ruling class (and most of the rest of the population too, for that matter) is united not only in opposing Communism but in wanting to wipe it off the face of the earth. But there are sharp differences about how to go about it, and nowhere are these differences more marked than in the Far East. The main cleavage is between those who want to play it cautious, treating China more or less as the United States has treated the Soviet Union since the early 1930s, and those who want to fight China now on the theory that a war is in any case inevitable and that the relative strength of the United States is greater now than it will be in the future.

This division in the ruling class is the clue to an understanding

of American policy in the Far East ever since the victory of the Chinese Revolution a decade ago. Perhaps a brief review of the main events of the post-World War II period will help us to see the present situation in its true proportions.

### The Collapse of Chiang Kai-shek

When the war in the Pacific ended in 1945, there were four "governments" in China: the Japanese occupying forces controlled most of the big cities and lines of communication; the Russians had moved into Manchuria; the Chinese Communists ruled the Northwest and a large part of the countryside; and Chiang Kai-shek held the extreme Southwest. American policy was to re-establish Chiang's control over the whole country. Thanks entirely to the agreement Roosevelt had negotiated with Stalin at Yalta, which guaranteed the cooperation of the USSR and the compliance of the Chinese Communists, this policy was successfully carried out. Fifty thousand United States marines were put into China to supervise the evacuation of the Japanese, and an enormous airlift shoehorned Kuomintang armies into controlling positions over a large part of the country. By the beginning of 1947 when General George C. Marshall returned from his famous mission to China (the purpose of which was to persuade the Communists peaceably to accept the return of Chiang), the United States seemed to have achieved one of the most brilliant foreign policy successes of history: Chiang was back in power, and America had a firm ally on the Asian continent. There were no differences in the American ruling class over China policy then: the bipartisan applause for the triumphant General, returned from the scene of (relatively) peaceful conquest, was unanimous and heartfelt.

This blissful state did not last very long, however. Fighting between Kuomintang and Communist armies, which had never completely stopped, increased in intensity and led directly to the collapse of the Chiang government and a full-scale Communist victory. By November 1948, when it was practically all over but the shouting, General Barr, chief American military adviser reported:

No battle has been lost [by Chiang's armies] since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debacles, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of the will to fight.

American foreign policy passed from one of its greatest successes to one of its greatest failures in the space of about two years.



### Toward the Recognition of Peking

The ignominious collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's regime led to an agonizing reappraisal of policy in Washington. Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, issued his famous China White Paper in the summer of 1949, a document which exposed and denounced Kuomintang misrule in such scathing terms that it could only have been intended to prepare the way for a complete break between Washington and Chiang's government on Formosa. On December 23, 1949, the United States Information Service issued a secret policy information paper concerning Formosa which was later made public at the MacArthur Hearings. We have cited the contents of this paper before in these pages ("What Every American Should Know about Formosa," March 1955), but memories tend to be short and it is perhaps wise to refresh them now three years later when Formosa is once again in the center of attention. The essential points are as follows:

(1) "Formosa, politically, economically, and geographically is part of China. . . . Politically and militarily it is a strict Chinese responsibility."

(2) "Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to these expectations."

(3) "Formosa has no special military significance."

(4) The United States has no "special interests" in or "designs" on the island or any military base in Formosa. "Seeking United States bases in Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units . . . would . . . involve the United States in a long-term venture producing at best a new area of bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involvement in open warfare."

On January 5, 1950, both President Truman and Mr. Acheson made public statements, the net effect of which was to confirm the policy set forth in the above paper and to disclaim any intention of sending American forces to protect the Chiang regime.

At about the same time, other countries were recognizing the new People's Republic of China and urging that Peking be given its rightful place in the United Nations. It seemed clear that the United States, however reluctantly, could not long delay following the same course.

### War in Korea

By early 1950, the drift of events was toward a reasonable settlement in the Far East, with Chiang Kai-shek relegated to the dustbin of history and the new government in Peking exercising the large re-

sponsibilities in the international community which had been assigned to China in the post-World War II settlements.

But there were powerful groups both in Asia and in America who dreaded nothing more than such a settlement. Among them, of course, were Chiang Kai-shek and his Korean counterpart Syngman Rhee. In this country, they included the more aggressive elements in the armed forces led by General MacArthur, who was then United States proconsul in Japan; the China Lobby and its stable of politicians like Knowland and Styles Bridges; and a traditional "Asia first" right wing in the Republican Party whose most prominent leader was John Foster Dulles, at the time special adviser to the State Department. These people were stunned and disorganized by the sudden collapse of Chiang's mainland regime: during 1949 and early 1950 they seemed to have been reduced to political impotence.

It was under these circumstances that the plots were hatched and the maneuvers set afoot which eventuated in the outbreak of war in Korea on June 25, 1950. We still can't *prove* it, but we are more convinced than ever that the North Koreans were deliberately provoked by Syngman Rhee, with the knowledge of Chiang and the encouragement of Dulles, to invade South Korea in such a way as to involve the United States in hostilities in the Far East. But whether or not this is true, there can be no shadow of a doubt that the main beneficiaries of war in Korea were Chiang and Rhee and the war-with-China crowd in the United States. Overnight, Truman and Acheson reversed American policy toward Chiang, sending the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait to protect him from a Communist takeover (remember that this was long *before* the Chinese were in any way involved in Korea). At the same time, Syngman Rhee's tottering throne was shored up by American bayonets.

For the war-with-China crowd, Korea was only a first step: some way had to be found to involve Red China. The great opportunity came when, following the Inchon landings in September, the North Koreans were put to rout. Originally, statements from both Washington and the United Nations were most explicit that the purpose of the fighting in Korea was to push the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel and thus to restore the territorial *status quo ante*. When this goal had been achieved—by October 1950—the Korean War should have been over.

For MacArthur, however, this would have spelled failure. Marching northward in pursuit of the retreating North Koreans, he hardly paused at the 38th Parallel—and was immediately backed by a weak

President and a compliant majority in the United Nations. When the Chinese, after due public and private warnings, sent their troops into Korea to restore the military balance in that country, it seemed at long last that MacArthur's efforts were about to be crowned with success.

## The Failure of MacArthurism

If, nevertheless, MacArthur failed to embroil the United States and China in a full-scale war, it was certainly not for want of trying. His famous "home by Christmas" offensive seemed to be deliberately inviting a military defeat which would arouse public opinion at home; and the subsequent retreat of the American armies, to the accompaniment of communiqués vastly exaggerating the extent of military operations and the magnitude of the casualties suffered, seemed designed to serve the same purpose. Chinese airspace was frequently violated, and MacArthur's headquarters continually pressed Washington for the right of "hot pursuit" of Chinese planes and for authority to bomb and blockade Chinese bases and cities. Finally, driven to desperation, MacArthur openly and ostentatiously disobeyed the orders of his superior officer, the President; and, having obtained the dismissal which he sought, he flew back to the United States to make an impassioned political appeal for a policy of all-out war against China.

All to no avail. Truman who had been so blind or pusillanimous when MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel going north, now took a firm stand against the spread of hostilities to China—and won.

How can we explain this apparent reversal of policy? The answer, as the MacArthur Hearings before a Senate Committee in the spring of 1951 made abundantly clear, was very simple. China had a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union which would automatically come into operation in case of an attack on Chinese territory. Washington did not know whether the USSR would honor the treaty, but the chance was greater than cautious military leaders like Generals Marshall and Bradley were willing to incur. The other reason was that America's European allies, and particularly Britain, made it perfectly clear that in case of a war against China the United States would have to go it alone. As General Bradley told the Senate Committee: "Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this [MacArthur's] strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy"—and,

it should be added, without any allies.

These considerations were decisive. MacArthurism, the policy of all-out war against China, was defeated.

### After the Korean Cease-Fire

The Truman administration curbed MacArthur but was still unwilling to make peace in Korea. On the first anniversary of the outbreak of the war, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations proposed a cease-fire. It was a full two years and tens of thousands of casualties later before the guns were finally silenced in Korea. Why this long and cruel delay?

In the answer to this question we get a glimpse of the true depth of the impasse into which America's Far Eastern policy had by this time fallen. Truman was unwilling to risk a war with China, but he was equally unwilling or afraid to make peace with China. And yet with the Korean shooting over, what justification would there be for continuing to protect Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa? What reason for not recognizing the Peking government as the true government of China? What excuse for continuing to deny it its rightful seat in the UN? The Truman administration had no answers to these questions, but rather than face up to them it preferred to allow the fighting in Korea to drag on.

Eventually, however, the disgust of the American people with the senseless slaughter in Korea, plus pressure from America's allies, forced the Eisenhower administration, elected partly on a pledge to end the war, to accept a cease-fire; and even Syngman Rhee's last-minute attempt to torpedo it by releasing the North Korean prisoners under his control failed to achieve its aim. It was not long before all the old problems reasserted themselves, demanding solutions. With the war in Korea over and America's role in Formosa increasingly anomalous, the familiar forces began to work again—or rather began to work with multiplied intensity. Chiang's regime deteriorated apace, and more and more of his men began to look longingly toward their homes and families from which they had been separated so long. Simultaneously, on the international level the pressure for recognition of Peking and its seating in the UN mounted anew, with India increasingly taking the lead. Slowly but surely the situation was returning to what had existed in 1949 and 1950 before the outbreak of the Korean War. Once again, the possibility of a peaceful settlement loomed up in the Far East.

### The Crisis of 1955

This was approximately the state of affairs which prevailed in the winter of 1954-1955. From the point of view of those whose aim was war with China, desperate measures were again called for as they had been five years earlier.

Messrs. Dulles, Knowland, and Radford—the latter had replaced MacArthur as the leading military exponent of immediate war with China—proved themselves equal to the occasion. They deliberately fabricated a Formosa crisis out of the capture by Peking of a small and relatively unimportant island which formed one of the chain of offshore islands from which Chiang had long been harrasing the mainland—an incident which could easily have been allowed to pass without notice or fanfare. Instead, Dulles, Radford *et al* made it the occasion for staging an elaborately publicized evacuation of the Tachen islands, stampeding through Congress a Joint Resolution giving the President a virtual free hand to use military force in the Formosa Strait area, and securing hasty Senate approval of a mutual assistance treaty with Chiang Kai-shek which had been pending for some time. They followed up these moves with a barrage of propaganda about the imminence of military action from the mainland, obviously intended to prepare the public for war and to put irresistible pressure on Eisenhower to cash the blank check which Congress had drawn to his order.

Once again, the war-now strategists seemed to be on the verge of success. And once again their plot misfired. Peking sat tight and refused to cooperate. Nothing happened. The excuse for launching an attack on China never came. The crisis blew over. And when Chou En-lai, at the Bandung Conference a few months later, repeated China's long-standing offer to enter into direct negotiations with the United States, the Eisenhower administration dared not refuse. The familiar dialectic was reasserting itself: after every unsuccessful attempt to launch a war a reverse tide toward negotiation and settlement sets in.

### The Initiative Passes to Peking

It is crucially important to recognize that time is on the side of Peking. Chiang Kai-shek's armies, like Chiang himself, are growing older. Sooner or later the old man will die, and his aging soldiers, realizing the hopelessness of their situation on Formosa, will seek an accommodation with the mainland regime. Peking has only to wait

for nature to take its course, applying such stimulation and pressure as may help to hasten the process along.

Chiang, on the other hand, and hence also his friends in the United States who desperately need his presence and assistance, cannot wait. They must force the pace of events, act recklessly, take chances in the hope of precipitating the "final struggle."

And this is precisely how they behaved in the period following the evaporation of the crisis of 1955. While going through the motions of negotiating with Peking at Geneva, the Chiang-Dulles team set about laying an elaborate trap for the Chinese Communists, just as they had laid a trap for the North Koreans in 1950. They deliberately weakened the defensive capabilities of Formosa and the Pescadores by transferring as much as a third of Chiang's battle-worthy forces to the exposed outpost islands of Quemoy and Matsu, only a few miles off the China coast. Militarily, of course, this was foolhardy in the extreme since there was never the slightest possibility that Chiang could mount an invasion of the mainland. What Chiang was doing—and he was doing it, as Dulles made clear in his press conference of September 9th, with the full knowledge and at least tacit approval of the United States—was to expose a large part of his forces to the danger of capture or destruction without the least hope of compensating military advantage. *But this was precisely the point of the operation.* Peking was being dared and tempted to make a grab for the islands. If it should yield to the temptation, Chiang-Dulles evidently counted on being able to stampede Washington into a full-scale rescue operation which in turn would very likely develop into the long-sought Sino-American war. The argument would be that Chiang's prestige and the morale of his forces were both irrevocably dependent on the holding of Quemoy and Matsu: Eisenhower would be literally forced to make the necessary finding that the defense of the offshore islands was essential to the defense of Formosa itself.

This was undeniably a clever scheme, and if the Chinese Reds had been as hot-headed as the North Koreans they might well have fallen into the trap set for them. Actually, however, with the initiative securely in their hands they proceeded with the greatest deliberation and caution. Though they might have acted at any time in the last year or so, they held off until the international position of the United States was thoroughly compromised by the debacle which overtook American policy in the Middle East during the summer. And they waited until Mao Tse-tung and his advisers had had an opportunity to discuss the whole problem with Khrushchev and the

Soviet military leadership. When they finally acted, it soon developed that their objective was not to seize the islands but rather to push the United States into a ridiculously untenable position and to force this country to resume negotiations in order to get off the hook. As Walter Lippmann put it in his perceptive column of September 9th:

At the weekend [September 6-7] it became clear that the military actions of Red China around Quemoy have limited objectives, that they are strictly controlled and carefully calculated. After a two-weeks bombardment, the Red Chinese had proved that they could blockade Quemoy. They had forced Chiang's government to admit that without American intervention Quemoy with its large garrison was surrounded and lost. As a result, the President had been faced with a decision he himself had hoped not to have to make, and all the world, our own people included, have been made to see that we might have to go to war for a fiction, for the pretense that the island of Quemoy is necessary to the defense of Formosa.

Note well that Peking was extremely careful not to present the world with a *fait accompli*. Military pressure was applied to Quemoy, but no attempt was made to seize the island. It was as though the Reds were saying: "You can see what Chiang has done with a large part of his forces. Their presence on Quemoy can serve no possible military purpose. Do you want to fight a major war to help him keep them there?" The implication, of course, was clear: the alternative to fighting a major war for no purpose whatever was simply to return Chiang's troops from the offshore islands to Formosa.\*

But this was not all. On the same day that Lippmann's column appeared the newspapers carried banner headlines announcing that Khrushchev had written a letter to Eisenhower containing the fateful words: "An attack on the People's Republic of China, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. Loyal to its duty, our country would do everything to defend,

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\* Since the above was written, evidence has accumulated that this is indeed Peking's position. On September 18th David Brinkley, NBC news commentator in Washington, broadcast an account of what happened at the opening session of the Warsaw talks which has all the earmarks of authenticity. According to Brinkley, the Chinese made the following proposal: "They will stop the artillery fire if Chiang's forces will leave Quemoy and Matsu. And they will not fire on the ships carrying his troops away. And they made another offer. They will agree to a truce if Chiang Kai-shek will move his troops back to Formosa and will then agree to stop his attacks on the mainland, his hit-and-run raids at night, and his dropping of propaganda leaflets from airplanes and balloons." If the United States finally elects to fight rather than accept these terms, the world should not have too much difficulty in deciding who is aggressing against whom.

jointly with People's China, the security of both countries and the interests of peace in the Far East and throughout the rest of the world." The United States was thus on notice not only that it might be headed for a war over a fiction, but that this time it would *certainly* be "the wrong war against the wrong enemy." And the reactions of America's staunchest European friends once again made it perfectly clear that it would have to be fought without allies, and indeed against the bitter opposition of the whole world.

Faced with this prospect, President Eisenhower jumped at the suggestion, made public in Peking by Premier Chou En-lai, that diplomatic negotiations be resumed between the People's Republic and the United States. As we write the talks have re-commenced, this time in Warsaw, after an interruption of some nine months. At the same time, high government officials from all over the world are gathering in New York for the regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, with the full expectation that the Formosa problem will come before them in one form or another.

The American government and people are thus once again facing a question which is as fateful as it is familiar: shall we plunge forward into war with China, or shall we pull back before it is too late? No one yet knows the answer, and the indications are certainly not reassuring. About the best reason for hope is that so far the decision has always gone in favor of pulling back. May it do so again.

If we are lucky and this crisis blows over as earlier ones have, pressures for some sort of settlement in the Far East will once again become strong. Unfortunately, after the experiences of the last ten years, there is no reason to assume that such a settlement will actually be reached. On the contrary, as long as Dulles is Secretary of State and Chiang is alive, we can confidently expect new and perhaps even more desperate attempts to start a war between the United States and China. After all, time is running out on both of them.

Would the outlook be any better if these two sinister gentlemen were to disappear from the political stage?

Last month we argued that no foreseeable change in Secretaries of State or even whole administrations can be expected to make much difference to America's Middle Eastern policy. Fortunately, this argument does not hold for the Far East. Our China policy for the best part of a decade now has been the subject of divided opinions and bitter conflict in the ruling class. At every turn, both Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek have played crucial roles in determining the outcome. It is by no means impossible that their departure would tip



## REVIEW OF THE MONTH

the balance in favor of a more cautious, and perhaps even a more rational, policy. The fact that not only Acheson but also a number of influential Senators from both political parties have been sharply critical of United States policy in the past few weeks lends weight to what might otherwise be a purely theoretical consideration.

The appropriate slogan for survival-minded Americans today is simple: Dulles and Chiang Must Go!

(September 17, 1958)

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*The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.*

—Edmund Burke

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*One cannot but love one's fatherland . . . but this love must not be a dead contentment with what exists, but a live desire for improvement; in a word, love of country must at the same time be love of humanity . . . to love one's homeland means to burn with a desire to see it a realization of the ideal of mankind and to the best of one's ability to promote the goal.*

—Voynich, *The Gadfly*

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*If as a nation we have become mad it is time for the world to take note of that madness. If we are still humane and sane, then it is time for the powerful voice of sanity to be heard once more in our land.*

—Lewis Mumford

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*I don't make jokes. I just watch the government and report the facts.*

—Will Rogers

## PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

BY C. WRIGHT MILLS

Social scientists want to understand not only social structure and history; they want to understand the varieties of individual men and women that are historically selected and formed by the social structures in which they live. The biographies of these people cannot be understood without reference to the historical structures in which are organized the milieus of their everyday lives. It is now possible to trace the meanings of historic transformations not only for individual ways of life but for the very characters of a variety of human beings. As the history-making unit, the nation-state is also the unit within which types of men and women are formed: it is the man-making unit. That is one reason why struggle between nations and between blocs of nations is also struggle over the types of human beings that will eventually prevail; that is why culture and politics are now so intimately related, and that is why there is such need and such demand for the sociological imagination. The problems of social and historical psychology are in many ways the most intriguing that we can today confront. For it is in this area, it happens, that the major intellectual traditions of our time, in fact of Western civilization, have now come to a most exciting confluence.

There is no end to arguments about the relations between "psychology" and "the social sciences." Most of the arguments have been formal attempts to integrate a variety of ideas about "the individual" and "the group." No doubt they are all useful, in some way to somebody; fortunately, in our attempt to formulate the tasks of social science, they need not concern us. For however psychologists may define their field of work, the economist and the sociologist, the political scientist, the anthropologist and the historian, in their studies of human society, must make assumptions about "human nature" and as well, by their studies, imply a variety of conceptions of man. These assumptions and implications now usually fall into the borderline area of "social psychology."

Interest in this area has increased because, like history, psychology

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*C. Wright Mills is Professor of Sociology at Columbia University. This essay is an excerpt from a book on the social sciences which Oxford University Press will publish in the early spring of 1959.*

is so fundamental to work in social sciences that in so far as psychologists have not turned to the problems involved, social scientists have become their own psychologists. Economists, long the most formalized of social scientists, have become aware that the old "economic man," hedonistic and calculating, can no longer be assumed as the psychological foundations of an adequate study of economic institutions. Within anthropology there has grown up a strong interest in "personality and culture"; within sociology as well as psychology, "social psychology" is now a busy field of study. Psychiatry—the most problematic field of both medicine and social study—has become a confusion of perspectives, drawn from virtually all social, biological, and psychological fields of study.

In reaction to these intellectual developments, some psychologists have taken up a variety of work in "social psychology," others have attempted, in a variety of ways, to redefine psychology so as to retain a field of study apart from obviously social factors, and some have confined their activities to work in human physiology. I do not wish to examine here the academic specialties within psychology—a field now greatly torn and split—much less to judge them.

There is one style of psychological reflection which has not usually been taken up explicitly by academic psychologists but which none the less has exerted influence upon them, as well as upon our entire intellectual life. In psychoanalysis, and especially in the work of Freud himself, the problem of the nature of human nature is stated within the broadest of frameworks. In brief, during the last generation, two and one-half steps forward have been taken by the less rigid of the psychoanalysts.

First, the physiology of the individual organism was transcended, and there began the study of those little family circles in which such dreadful melodramas occurred. Freud may be said to have discovered from an unexpected viewpoint—the medical—the analysis of the individual in his parental family. Of course, the "influence" of the family upon man had been noticed; what was new was that as a social institution it became, in Freud's view, intrinsic to the inner character and life-fate of the individual.

Second, the social element in the lens of psychoanalysis was greatly broadened, especially by what may be called sociological work on the superego. In America, to the psychoanalytic tradition was joined one having quite different sources, which came to early flower in the social behaviorism of George H. Mead. But then a limitation or a hesitancy set in. The small-scale setting of "interpersonal relations"

is now clearly seen; the broader context in which these relations themselves, and hence the individual himself, are situated has not been. There are, of course, exceptions, notably Erich Fromm who has related economic and religious institutions and traced out their meaning for types of individuals. One reason for the general hesitancy is the limited social role of the analyst; his work and his perspective are professionally tied to the individual patient; the problems of which he is aware and of which he can readily become aware, under the specialized conditions of his practice, are limited and limiting. Unfortunately, psychoanalysis has not become a firm and integral part of academic research.\*

The next step forward in psychoanalytic studies is to do fully for other institutional areas what Freud began to do so magnificently for kinship institutions of a selected type. What is needed is the idea of social structure as a composition of institutional orders, each of which we must study psychologically as Freud studied certain kinship institutions. The psychiatry, the actual therapy of "interpersonal" relations, has already begun to raise questions about a troublesome central point: the tendency to anchor values and norms in the supposed needs of the individuals *per se*. For if the individual's very nature cannot be understood without close reference to social reality, then we must analyze it in such reference. And such analysis includes not only the locating of the individual, as a biographical entity, within various interpersonal milieux—but the locating of these milieux within their social structure.

On the basis of developments in psychoanalysis, as well as in social psychology as a whole, it is now possible to state briefly the psychological concerns of the social sciences. I list here, in the barest of summary, only those propositions which I take as the most fruitful hunches, or, at the least, as legitimate assumptions on the part of the working social scientist.\*\*

(1) The external biography of an individual cannot be adequate—

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\* Another major reason for the tendency to apotheosize "interpersonal relations" is the sponge-like quality and limitations of the word "culture," in terms of which much of the social in man's depths has been recognized and asserted. In contrast with social structure, the concept "culture" is one of the spongiest words in social science, although, perhaps for that reason, in the hands of an expert, enormously useful. In practice, the concept "culture" is more often a loose reference to social milieux plus "tradition" than an adequate idea of social structure.

\*\* For detailed discussion of the point of view expressed here, see Gerth and Mills, *Character and Social Structure*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953.)

ly understood without references to the institutions within which it is enacted. For this biography consists of acquiring, of dropping, of modifying, in a very intimate way, of moving from one role to another. One is a child in a certain kind of family, one is a playmate in a certain kind of child's group; a student, a workman, a foreman, a general, a mother. Much of human life consists of playing such roles within specific institutions. To understand the biography of an individual, we must understand the significance and meaning of the roles he has played and does play; to understand these roles we must understand the institutions of which they are a part.

(2) But the view of man as a social creature enables us to go much deeper than merely viewing the external biography as a sequence of social roles. Such a view requires us to understand the most internal and "psychological" features of man: in particular, his self-image and his conscience and indeed the very growth of his mind. It may well be that the most radical discovery within recent psychology, psychoanalysis, and social science is the discovery of how so many of the most intimate features of the person are socially patterned and even implanted. Within the quite broad limits of the glandular and nervous apparatus, the emotions of fear and hatred and love and rage, in all their varieties, must be understood in close and continual reference to the social biography and the social context in which they are experienced and expressed. Within the quite broad limits of the physiology of the sense organs, our very perception of the physical world, the colors we discriminate, the smells we become aware of, the noises we hear, are socially patterned and socially limited. The motivations of men, and even the varying extents to which various types of men are typically aware of them, are to be understood in terms of the vocabularies of motive that prevail in a society and of social changes and confusions among such vocabularies.

(3) The biography and the character of the individual cannot be understood merely in terms of milieux, and certainly not entirely in terms of early milieux—those of the infant and the child. Adequate understanding requires the setting of these milieux, both earlier and later, in their structural framework, taking into account any transformations of this framework that may occur within the span of the individual's lifetime.

The understanding of social structure and of structural changes as they bear upon more intimate milieux enables us to understand the causes of individual conduct, feelings, and limitations on self-awareness, which men in specific milieux cannot themselves detect. The test

of an adequate conception of any type of man cannot rest upon whether individuals of this type find it pleasantly in line with their own self-images. Often in fact it is because they live only in certain milieux that men do not and cannot be expected to know the causes of their condition and the limits of their selfhood. Groups of men who have truly adequate views of themselves and of their own social positions are indeed rare. To assume the contrary, as is often done by virtue of the very methods used by some social scientists, is to assume a degree of rational self-consciousness and self-knowledge that not even 18th century psychologists would allow. Max Weber's idea of "The Puritan Man," of his motives and of his function within religious and economic institutions, enables us to understand him better than he understood himself: Weber's use of the notion of structure enabled him to transcend "the individual's" own awareness of himself and his milieux.

The relevance of earlier experience, "the weight" of childhood, in the psychology of adult character is itself relative to the type of childhood and the type of social biography that prevail in various given societies. It is, for example, now quite apparent that the role of "the father" in the building of a personality must be stated within the limits of specific types of fathers and specific types of families, and in terms of the place such families occupy within the social structure of which these families are a part.

(4) The idea of social structure cannot be built up only from ideas or from facts about a specific series of individuals, their reactions to their milieux. Attempts to explain social and historical events, economics and political, religious, and military institutions, on the basis of psychological theories about "the individual" often rest upon the assumption that society is nothing but a great scatter of individuals and that, accordingly, if we know all about these "atoms" we can in some way add up the information and thus know about society. It is not a fruitful assumption. In fact, we cannot even know what is most elemental about "the individual" by any psychological study of him as a socially isolated creature. Except in the abstract building of models, which of course may be useful, the economist cannot assume The Economic Man; nor can the psychiatrist of family life (and practically all psychiatrists are, in fact, specialists of this one social area) assume the classical Oedipal Man. For just as the structural relations of economic and political roles are now often decisive for understanding the economic conduct of individuals, so are the great changes, since Victorian fatherhood, in the roles within the

family and in the family's location as an institution within modern societies.

(5) The principle of historical specificity holds for psychology as well as for the social sciences. Even quite intimate features of man's inner life are best formulated as problems within specific historical contexts. To realize that this is an entirely reasonable assumption, one has only to reflect for a moment upon the wide variety of men and women that is displayed in the course of human history. Psychologists, as well as social scientists, should indeed think well before finishing any sentences the subject of which is "man."

The human variety is such that no "elemental" psychologies, no theory of "instincts," no principles of "basic human nature" of which we know, enable us to account for the enormous human variety of types and individuals. Anything that can be asserted about man apart from what is inherent in the social-historical realities of human life will refer mainly to the quite wide biological limits and potentialities of the human species. Within these limits and rising out of these potentialities, such a panorama of human types confronts us that to attempt to explain it in terms of a theory of "basic human nature" is to confine human history itself in some arid little cage of concepts about "human nature"—as often as not constructed from some precise and irrelevant trivialities about mice in a maze.

The very idea of some "human nature" common to man as man is a violation of the social and historical specificity that careful work in the human studies requires; at the very least, it is an abstraction that social students have not earned the right to make. Surely we ought occasionally to remember that in truth we do not know much about man, and that all the knowledge we do have does not entirely remove the element of mystery that surrounds his variety as it is revealed in history and in biography. Sometimes we do want to wallow in that mystery, to feel that we are, after all, a part of it, and perhaps we should; but being men of the West, we will inevitably also study the human variety, which for us means removing the mystery from our view of it. In doing so, let us not forget what it is we are studying and how little we know of man, of history, of biography, and of the societies of which we are at once creators and creatures. Realizing this, perhaps we should be at once more careful and less pretentious about the methods we would employ when we get down to our work.

## BEHIND THE TREASON TRIAL IN SOUTH AFRICA

BY JULIUS LEWIN

South Africa is an easy target to attack. Its racial policies are so crude, their disguises so thin, that every weak, half-baked liberal in Christendom can display his strength by attacking South Africa.

But the real significance of the situation there is not exposed by sheer invective and abuse which too often serve only to obscure the questions that require answers. Two of these questions are: Is South Africa a police state? And will resistance to white supremacy continue?

These and other similar questions have acquired a dramatic urgency in the light of the treason trial at present under way before the Supreme Court in Pretoria. The trial began in December 1956 with 156 men and women of all races sitting in the dock. Early this year 65 of these were released, including ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress, but the defense lawyers were unable to detect in the releases a pattern that would indicate why some men were freed and others held.

Month after month in the prolonged preliminary stages of the trial the police brought forward an enormous number (over 10,000) of documents as evidence of the nature of the activities organized by some or other of the defendants. Broadly and briefly speaking, the police allege that most of the public campaigns against new racial laws and for human rights in recent years were planned and conducted by the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies, namely, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Colored People's Organization, and a small white society called the Congress of Democrats, aided by the weekly paper *New Age* and the monthly *Fighting Talk* (originally a veterans' journal).

One of the key documents in the case is the Freedom Charter (the full text of which appears in the book published by MR Press, *The South African Treason Trial* by Lionel Forman and Solly Sachs). This historic document contains echoes of the American Declaration

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of Independence and the UN Declaration of Human Rights; it also demanded that "mineral wealth, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole"; . . . that "the land shall be shared among those who work it"; . . . and that "there shall be a national minimum wage". Just what such demands about the distribution of wealth may have been intended to imply is one of the issues in the trial, since the question of socialism or communism has been raised.

It was bound to be raised because the police case against the defendants rests on two grounds, treason and communism. According to the wide old medieval Roman-Dutch law which is still applied in South Africa, high treason is committed by those who "with hostile intent try to coerce the governing authority of their country, even though there is no direct proof that they aimed at wholly subverting the government". As far as anyone can see without having read the whole of the court record, most of the evidence so far produced in the trial relates to speeches made and documents drawn up and circulated usually without any attempt at maintaining secrecy. The climax of the various campaigns seems to have been reached at the "Congress of the People" held in Johannesburg in June 1955 when the Freedom Charter was adopted at a great gathering (attended also by the police). It has been argued in court that this was not simply a political demonstration, as it purported to be, but a serious attempt to set up a people's parliament as a sort of rival authority to the Union Parliament in Cape Town. This view has been rebutted but the full defense against it—and to the charges generally—has not yet been disclosed.

Incidentally, if some of the defendants are ultimately convicted of treason, no one really believes that they will be hanged. Although treason *can* be punished by death, the penalty hitherto usually applied in South Africa has been imprisonment for a couple of years or even the mild penalty of a fine. The main reason for such leniency is that in a sense it is true that treason is an old custom in this country. Afrikaners, in their periodic resistance to British rule in the past, were on occasion convicted of treason but seldom, if ever, hanged. The present trial is, however, the first in which treason is linked with race relations between white and black.

The outcome of the treason trial is more likely to depend on the interpretation given to the Suppression of Communism Act. This law, passed in 1950, makes it a serious crime to promote any of the objects of "communism", which is defined in a startlingly broad way.

"Communism" includes not only Marxian socialism but also "any doctrine or scheme that aims at bringing about any change (political, industrial, social, or economic) by unlawful acts or by the threat of them". One of the objects of "communism" specially mentioned is the causing of hostility against the white race.

This attempt to suppress "communism" must be seen against its background. For the last thirty years successive governments have tried to prevent radical ideas of all kinds from reaching Africans. For a variety of reasons this has proved to be a tremendous task. It is worth outlining this problem for the glimpse it gives of the obstacles that still stand in the way of reducing South Africa to a police state.

The first attempt to curb the public discussion of African grievances came in 1927 when Section 29 of the Native Administration Act made it a crime to say or do anything "with intent to promote feelings of hostility between white and black". This was a severe restriction because it meant that even a calm recital of the legal disabilities imposed on Africans, if presented to an African audience, might conceivably cause ill-feeling between the two races. However, in a case heard in 1929, the Supreme Court in the Eastern Cape province interpreted the law in a way that limited its effect. Sydney Bunting, then prominent in the Communist Party of South Africa, had run for election to parliament in an area where some hundreds of Africans could at that time still vote. At the end of the election campaign (which he lost), Bunting was charged with the offense of creating hostility between black and white. He was, however, able to satisfy the court that, on the contrary, believing as he did in the universal brotherhood of man, he had preached racial equality and goodwill. If his speeches had had the effect of causing black men to hate their white rulers, it had certainly not been his intention to produce that effect. The court accepted this, ruling that the police had to prove intention before they could secure a conviction; and so Bunting was acquitted.

The government of the day would not submit to this setback. In the following year the Minister of Justice, Oswald Pirow, got parliament to tighten the law. (This Mr. Pirow, an eminent lawyer, was called back from retirement by the recent Strydom Government to lead the police case in the treason trial). It was too difficult for the police to prove that a speaker or writer *intended* to set black against white. Of course, this difficulty was at bottom due to the fact that communists, socialists, and liberals alike all believe that interracial cooperation is necessary to social progress. It is thus highly

improbable that any radically-minded speaker or writer would deliberately provoke racial animosity (the fear of which always lurks in the guilty minds of the ruling race).

The new law revealed the shape of things to come. It invented a new penalty in the form of banishment from any area and it gave the Minister, not the courts, the power to apply this penalty to anyone who, *in his opinion*, was guilty of causing feelings of hostility between the races. Since the 1930s successive governments have from time to time used this power to punish "agitators" whose words or activities were deemed to be dangerous.

The recent Act to suppress "communism" included as one of the aims of communism in its peculiar South African definition the creation of interracial hostility. Anyone named and blacklisted as a communist by the "Liquidator" (that is his official title) is now subject to heavier penalties than mere banishment, harsh as that is. Yet the task of the secret political police has not been simplified by the laws that have every year grown tighter with each turn of the screw. Critics of white supremacy have naturally had to watch their words. Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky at once vanished from all political propaganda. A cynic might, indeed, be tempted to say that the political education of Africans continued more, not less, rapidly when it was offered without the aid of abstractions or complicated theory. However that may be, it did continue, assisted by events in the changing continent and world beyond the unchanging Union of South Africa.

The Communist Party was, however, dissolved and most of its leading members were prohibited by legal orders from any further political activities. They were forbidden to attend not only public or committee meetings but even social gatherings. The secretary of the African National Congress was once charged with the crime of having tea with a few friends. This absurdity was modified only when the Supreme Court excluded mere social gatherings from the law. But last year parliament restored to the government the power to forbid social intercourse between Africans and those white people suspected of harboring dangerous thoughts about human equality.

As it happened, however, avowed Communists had never been the sole or even the main source of radicalism in a country with a long tradition of protest against racial discrimination and color prejudice. There had been some white liberals—mainly but not entirely Christian missionaries—at work in the public life of South Africa all through the nineteenth century. Moreover, as Professor Z. K. Matthews (one of the African defendants in the treason trial) once

said: "The African people did not require communists to teach them to defend their rights. Ever since the Bantu tribes first encountered the Europeans, long before the Communist Manifesto was even thought of, they have struggled for equal rights in the land of their birth. They will continue their struggle and not allow themselves to be browbeaten by smear tactics in their determined fight for their liberation."

The campaign against white supremacy was accordingly carried on after 1950, as before, in various ways. In fact, the dissolution of the Communist Party left the way wider open for the growth and development of the African National Congress. This body had lingered in a long adolescence,\* but after 1946 it began to attain political maturity and by 1953 it demanded nothing less than full racial equality, an aim also adopted by the newly formed Liberal Party run by enlightened white people eager to encourage interracial contact as the right answer to *apartheid*.

The adoption at that juncture by the ANC of a broad radical program was understandable. After 1948, when the Afrikaner Nationalists gained their first parliamentary victory, it became perfectly clear that the emerging middle class Africans had nothing to hope for by pursuing a moderate line and being ready to compromise their claims to human rights. There were, too, economic factors that accounted for the ANC's bolder attitude. Africans in the Union of South Africa had never really constituted a strong middle class. Their leaders had such occupations as preachers, teachers, clerks, journalists, and (more recently) doctors and lawyers. African business men or traders of any type are few in number in the country to this day and fewer still in the ranks of the ANC. These types of men can hardly be compared in economic strength with the bourgeoisie that developed in Europe (or even in West Africa in this century). The African elite in the Union represent less a rising economic interest than an emotional and intellectual revolt against restrictive laws and personal indignities resulting from racism. The equality they seek is that which prevails in a free competitive society based on capitalism, not that in a classless society based on socialism. This is only an embryonic middle class, and, having been denied all opportunities of advancement as a group distinguishable from the mass of black laborers, it has in effect been forced to throw in its lot with

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\* The best account of its growth is in *The Treason Cage* by Anthony Sampson (London: Heinemann, 1958).

the working class and to make common cause with it against the disabilities imposed on all Africans as such.

The ANC thus became a broad movement embracing all politically awakened Africans. It was not hostile to Europeans, Indians, or Colored people of mixed descent, and it carefully avoided slogans like "Africa for the Africans," which might imply a desire to substitute black supremacy for white.

This program of interracial cooperation on the basis of equality attracted support from various quarters. Hence the prevailing paradox that the stricter the law has become about race relations and free speech, the wider has grown the public interest in those very ideas about human rights and wrongs that the Government is determined to extinguish.

There is a deep irony in this fact. The Act to suppress so-called "communism" actually became an instrument that accelerated informal cooperation among like-minded people of all races who detested the Nationalists and wanted to put forward an alternative program to save South Africa from ruin. White liberals, aggressive Christians, socialists of all shades, and, indeed, even conservatives with a social conscience have in recent years made common cause in recognizing human rights as the best basis for the reconstruction of a plural society. These diverse elements are united by their perception that Africa, like America, is not destined to remain half slave and half free.

This open alliance will continue to confront the Nationalist Government with an awkward though unacknowledged question—can the rule of law be maintained in a society built on racism? Dr. Oliver C. Cox once suggested that the rule of law and racial discrimination are ultimately incompatible ends. Forced to choose between them, the Afrikaner Nationalists would obviously sacrifice the rule of law. Why have they not already done so to a greater degree than they have in fact? The answer seems to lie in the solidly entrenched economic interests of the English speaking section of the white race, who are scared of the ruling Afrikaners and who require the maintenance of the rule of law for the protection of these interests. This answer is tentatively advanced here in the belief that it may help to explain why the rule of law has not yet been suspended altogether. The question remains how far its operation will be further curtailed in the coming years. Will a Suppression of Liberalism Act be contemplated? But the trouble with such legislation would be that it would not be applauded in Washington and in London as the Suppression

of Communism Act no doubt was. To attack communism in 1950 was to be sure of encouragement and support; to attack liberalism in 1960 would be a very different proposition. Only time can tell whether the power-drunk Nationalists will undertake such an adventure. If so, the historians will see the treason trial, whatever its ultimate outcome, as one stage in a course foreshadowed ten years ago by Mr. Strydom himself when he declared that "anyone who purposely tried to upset the Government's plan to put into operation its *apartheid* policy or who failed to do his duty towards the realization of that aim would be guilty of treason".

## A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS IS NEEDED

BY DON HARRISON

Socialists are naturally concerned about peace and the major problems of the world—the East-West conflict, nationalist and liberation movements, differences within the Soviet-bloc countries, and so on. Socialism is a world-wide movement for thinking people, and it is only natural that socialists should be vitally interested in world events. However, most socialists have sharp disagreements in their approach to foreign policy and world affairs. These differences are primarily based on their attitudes towards the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact we might conveniently place almost all socialists into three broad categories, based on whether they believe that

- (1) Russia is good;
- (2) Russia is bad, but we can coexist;
- (3) Russia is impossible to live with.

Or perhaps some might argue that a more accurate classification

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*Don Harrison is the pen name of the editor of a union local publication.*

## A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS IS NEEDED

would be according to a belief that

- (1) Russia is socialist and democratic;
- (2) Russia is socialist, but not democratic;
- (3) Russia is a fascist-like dictatorship.

Anyone who believes that a planned economy will achieve a better way of life, regardless of where he fits into the above categories, is a socialist.

There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of non-socialist Americans fall into the third category, under either system of classification. They are thoroughly convinced that the Soviet Union is a fascist-like dictatorship, and impossible to live with. Only a radical change in objective conditions can convince them otherwise.

Socialist publications devote a considerable part of their valuable space and efforts to such subjects as disarmament, banning the bombs, non-intervention, recognition of Red China, and defense of civil liberties for Communists. But as long as the American people consider the Soviet Union to be sneaky, untrustworthy, and a menace to world peace, these words of wisdom fall on deaf ears and are, for all practical purposes, wasted efforts. Before we can convince any non-socialists of the need for a reduction in defense expenditures, we must first prove that the Soviet Union is not a menace to world peace. I don't think any of us are in a position to do so at this time. As editor of a trade union publication, I have found it expedient to avoid any mention of foreign policy. To pretend that the Soviet Union is a champion of world peace would immediately isolate me. To argue for disarmament on any other basis would be pointless.

On domestic issues, however, socialists are fairly well united. While we may differ in our interpretation of specific events, on how socialism can be achieved in this country, on coalition tactics, and the like—there is essential agreement on the basic issue of how to solve our nation's economic problems. The only effective and permanent solution to all our economic ills lies in the establishment of a planned economy and the elimination of the profit system.

The current recession is making people more thoughtful and receptive to radical ideas. Rank and file workers are rapidly becoming disillusioned with the mild measures and reforms proposed by their so-called leaders. They are beginning to realize that even if every proposed piece of labor legislation were passed, they would be only slightly better off. The AFL-CIO legislative program for a \$1.25 minimum wage, the \$100 increased tax exemption, stop-gap housing programs, and so on, might tend to alleviate some problems but it offers no

permanent solution to any. Under the circumstances, I believe that workers would be highly receptive to a concentrated effort on the part of all socialists to present their arguments for a planned economy.

Such an effort must be based on sound economic principles and on the American situation. Whether socialism has succeeded or failed in other countries is irrelevant. Nor is it important whether our ideas are based on Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, DeLeon, or Debs. Our only concern should be how to plan an American economy that would provide a decent standard of living for all, eliminate unemployment, provide more leisure time, protect our health, and raise our cultural standards. We must also be prepared to answer the stock arguments of the anti-socialists by explaining how socialism provides opportunities for initiative and incentive, how it strengthens rather than destroys democracy, and how we propose to guard against bureaucracy or tyranny. It certainly should not be very difficult for socialists to agree on such a program.

The merits of socialism and a planned economy have not received any widespread discussion or publicity in this country since the Debs campaigns. As a result, most non-socialist Americans have never even heard anyone argue for socialism, and think of it as something foreign and as the antithesis of democracy. If we could only find a way to get people to think about and discuss the question of socialism, I am certain that we could soon find thousands, if not millions, of additional supporters.

The road to a worker's heart is through his stomach, or pocket. American socialists must change their emphasis and concentrate on offering a solution to our economic problems. I do not propose that we neglect world politics. We must continue to analyze and present our views on such issues as peace and disarmament. But the peace issue by itself will not win many new adherents to socialism. The only way the American people will ever learn the true meaning of socialism is when we socialists make an honest effort to tell them.

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*The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.*

—Franklin D. Roosevelt



## MARXISM: A TALK TO STUDENTS

BY PAUL M. SWEEZY

(This is the transcript of an informal talk made to a group of students during the summer session at Cornell.—P.M.S.)

This is in lieu of an office hour, and the reason for it is that quite a few of you may have the same questions in mind as I have been asked in several earlier office hours. They are good questions and I would like to try to answer them as best I can without keeping you too long.

You will understand, of course, that the answers I give are both very partial and very personal. There are undoubtedly many other people in the world who would call themselves Marxists but who would disagree with much or all that I have to say. Never mind—I am not speaking for anyone but myself, and what I have to say has no pretense to being generally acceptable or authoritative doctrine.

Marxism is a body of philosophical, economical, political, sociological, scientific doctrines or principles, all interrelated and together forming an independent and more or less self-sufficient intellectual structure. Some of the doctrines or principles are of primary importance, some of secondary or lesser importance. My own view is that two people can be Marxists without necessarily agreeing on everything; further, that much in such an intellectual structure is and must be subject to change with the advance of knowledge and understanding. Here I am going to concentrate on a few of what seem to me to be primary principles.

Perhaps most important of all, Marxism has a theory of the life history and destiny of man which is simple in its main outline and incalculably far-reaching in its implications. It is a rational, not a mystical, theory, but like all such theories it can never be proved in any precise or scientific fashion. It is a guide to life and understanding, and in the long run its validity will have to be judged by its fruits.

This theory is that all civilization up to now has been tainted or corrupted by a common poison, the exploitation of man by man.

The "fall" came, not when Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden of Eden but when man's productivity became great enough to make it worthwhile for one human being to enslave another. With that act, society was split into exploiters and exploited, and the poison entered into the hearts of both.

Marxism does not, however, hanker for the lost Eden of a primitive communism (if such ever existed). Civilization was impossible without exploitation. Unless the few rose on the backs of the many, we could never have had learning, art, culture. But original sin was at work all the same: civilization was *necessarily* tainted. Societies were *inevitably* divided against themselves. Individuals were *ineluctably* dehumanized.

All this was inevitable, that is to say, as long as the productivity of human labor was so low that civilization could flourish only if the whole surplus was concentrated in the hands of a few, so that luxury, wealth, civilization at one pole was necessarily matched by misery, poverty, and degradation at the other.

It was into such a world that capitalism was born—capitalism, the latest and most developed form of exploitative class society, a society based not on slavery or serfdom but on free wage labor, a society in which the surplus goes to the owners of the means of production in the form of profit, interest, and rent. It turned out, for reasons which we cannot pause to examine now, that this capitalism was incomparably the most productive and progressive society the world had ever seen. So amazingly so, indeed, that for the first time ever it made possible a society in which exploitation of man by man was no longer the *necessary* precondition of civilization.

Now the human race faced a great divide, a prospect without precedent. Would it go forward to a new and higher, nonexploitative form of civilization? Or would it fail to seize the new opportunities opened up to it? Put in metaphorical terms, would the original sin of enslavement now be atoned, or would the exploitation of man by man continue to be the way of human life?

The Marxist answer is that this is another way of posing the question of capitalism or socialism. Capitalism—the private ownership of the means of production—is necessarily exploitative and can never be anything else. No matter how productive it becomes, it can never eliminate the division of society against itself. And if, as in the most wealthy capitalist countries today, this does not take the traditional form of arrogant luxury against abject poverty, it does take the form of cultural schizophrenia with the leaders of society deliberately de-

## MARXISM: A TALK TO STUDENTS

grading and corrupting the masses—and in the process corrupting themselves.

But what are the chances of a change to a more rational society, a more civilized society, a society of genuine human solidarity? Marxism holds that it can never be the result of mere ideas or ideals. It must be the result of human agency, and this means that it can only be brought about by the class or classes under capitalism who bear the full brunt of the irrationality and cruelty of the system. Marx himself thought that this meant the workers in the most advanced capitalist countries.

Alas, he was wrong. The advanced countries managed to harness their productivity to give the workers a tolerable even if degraded life, and they increasingly imposed the heaviest burdens on the peoples of the colonies and the raw-material-producing backward countries. It was, indeed, at least partly out of the surpluses squeezed from these hapless victims of capitalist imperialism that the workers of the metropoli were provided with the living standards which kept them from recognizing and revolting against the inhuman standards of capitalist civilization.

And so we come to the great paradox of the modern world: capitalism has so poisoned its immediate victims as to paralyze them, and at the same time it has awakened and set into motion the vast masses of the backward countries who are now the ones to bear openly and undisguisedly the burdens of the irrationalities of capitalism—irrationalities which must be counted in terms of world wars, depressions, fascism.

The revolt against capitalism thus broke out, not as Marx thought it would, in the most developed countries, but on the contrary in the underdeveloped parts of the world, and it therefore inevitably took on the character not only of a social struggle but also of a national struggle. The possibility to build on the accomplishments and achievements of capitalism did not exist, except insofar as these achievements could be borrowed or copied—at best a slow and difficult task. For the rest, everything had to be built from scratch not only without the help of the advanced countries but for the most part against their bitter opposition.

Under these circumstances, the socialism which came into the world as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1917 was not the advanced democratic society which Marx anticipated but a harsh and brutal dictatorship ruthlessly sacrificing thousands and millions of human beings to the cause of "catching up" in the shortest possible

time with the economically developed countries.

This undeniable historical fact poses a crucial question which every Marxist must attempt to answer for himself. Was it wrong to have faith that through common ownership of the means of production and economic planning mankind can hope to create a new civilization free of the taint of exploitation of man by man?

I do not myself draw this conclusion. *Given* the failure of socialism to come to power in the advanced countries, I think a long period of disappointment and frustration was inevitable. If Britain and Germany and the United States had led the way into socialism, with their enormous productive potentials, I see no reason to suppose that the story would not have been an entirely different and infinitely brighter one.

But the question remains: Hasn't the manner of its birth permanently tainted socialism just as surely as exploitation tainted all previous forms of society?

It is too early to say. I see indications in the socialized countries of today which would point in that direction. But I also see hopeful signs, too. Especially is the enormous development of the forces of production, taken together with a passionate concern for universal education, a hopeful sign. In my more optimistic moments I argue that such a process must, in a relatively short historical time, have a revolutionizing effect on the societies where it is in operation. The Russians and Chinese today are no longer the illiterate peasants of 1917 or 1948, and when they have reached a certain level of culture and education they will no longer be content to allow themselves to be governed by a tightly organized and self-renewing leadership. Then, it seems to me, we shall begin to get our first really decisive test of the Marxian theory. Then we shall find out whether original sin can be overcome here on this earth, or whether it is indeed an inevitable aspect of human nature from which there is no escape in this vale of tears.

At any rate, I can see no better hope for the world. The advanced countries, and especially the United States, have lost their chance to lead the way. They will be overtaken and surpassed economically by the centrally planned economies in a matter of two or three decades, more or less. The presently so-called uncommitted countries are bound to be attracted by such successes and to take the way of public ownership and planning. And this process will only be hastened by the nationalist struggles to escape from the old network of colonial and imperialist relations which is now being waged by almost all of the un-

## MARXISM: A TALK TO STUDENTS

derdeveloped countries of the world. There are a thousand reasons, historical, economic, and psychological, why the United States can never ally itself with the rising forces in the underdeveloped world—and in the long run this in and by itself is enough to assure that we shall be left behind by history.

I would like to see the United States wake up and lead the procession rather than follow along in an increasingly isolated and discredited position. But honesty compels me to say that I see little likelihood of such a development. World leadership, for better or worse, is on the point of passing out of the hands of Western white civilization and into those of a new Eastern and predominantly colored civilization. One can regret it, but I don't think I do. I only hope that the new civilization that is coming succeeds better than ours has in realizing what I still hold to be the great potentialities of the human race.

As for us Americans, if the world survives at all, we will of course rejoin the procession sooner or later, and I think the duty of those who understand what is happening in the world and still retain their faith in man is to do what they can, no matter how little it may be, to make it as soon as possible.

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*The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in Nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account. But when once we have recognized them and understood how they work, . . . the gradual subjection of them to our will and the use of them for the attainment of our aims depends entirely upon ourselves. . . . This treatment of the productive forces of the present day . . . opens the way to the replacement of the anarchy of social production by a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual. The capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer, and then also the appropriator, will thereby be replaced by the mode of appropriation of the products based on the nature of the modern means of production themselves. . . .*

—Engels, *Anti-Dühring*

## CRISIS OF MARXISM?

BY PAUL A. BARAN

Just as ample rainfall seldom fails to yield a large crop of mushrooms, so a period of sustained prosperity and high employment under capitalism produces almost inevitably a strong wave of confusion and uncertainty about the validity of the socialist cause, about the rationale of a socialist movement. Indeed, at the present time this vogue has swept not only large numbers of more or less distant sympathizers of socialism; even many of those who have been identified with the socialist movement have turned their backs on Marxism, rejecting it outright in favor of some variant of "New Dealism" and bourgeois liberalism or proclaiming the necessity for major revisions of what they take to be the Marxian doctrine. This raises two complex and closely interconnected questions: *First*, has the development of capitalism (in general, and in particular countries) taken such a turn as to obliterate the need for and the desirability of a socialist transformation of society? *Second*, has the development of capitalism taken such a turn as to so weaken the forces of socialism that a socialist transformation of society becomes impossible or highly improbable—even if it be most urgent and most desirable? In what follows, an attempt will be made to deal with these questions in "desperate brevity," not in the hope of being able to supply definitive answers but rather in order to suggest what might represent useful points of departure for further reflection and further discussion.

### I

The first question must be examined in the light of American experience, for it is with reference to American capitalism that the matter is usually considered. Indeed, in the United States—the principal citadel of capitalism today—the structure of the capitalist order differs in many important respects from what was described by Engels in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* or even in the much later writings of Marx. The most conspicuous and farth-

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est-reaching difference between American capitalism now and what may be regarded as the beginning of its modern era—the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century—is the enormous advance made in the development of the forces of production. According to some estimates, productivity per man-hour in the American economy as a whole is now over five times as much as it was in 1880. Since these estimates are arrived at by taking into account the *entire* labor force employed in business, they obviously seriously understate the productivity increase per man-hour of *production* workers, i.e., of labor engaged in the process of production of goods and services, rather than in that of selling, advertising, etc. This underestimation is aggravated by the fact that even a goodly proportion of the production workers is actually engaged in *selling*: putting chrome and fins on automobiles, turning and twisting perfectly functional articles in order to create artificial obsolescence of earlier models, and the like. The importance of this productivity increase of production workers can hardly be exaggerated. In the first place, there is much evidence—if not yet systematically collated and analyzed—that the real wages of production workers have risen significantly less than their productivity. This means that the *economic surplus* produced by society has grown considerably larger, not only in absolute terms, but in the only relevant sense: as a share of aggregate output.

What is perhaps no less portentous: while this spectacular increase of output per man-hour was achieved to some extent by a marked improvement of health and efficiency of the working population, its mainspring was a vast expansion of the volume of productive equipment. The dimensions of this expansion can be at least partly assessed if it is considered that manufacturing establishments now use approximately 10 horsepower of energy per production worker employed as compared with 1.25 horsepower in 1879. This sweeping mechanization was propelled by massive capital accumulation, by extensive exploitation of “economies of scale,” and by a consequent general transition to mass production methods. And this in turn has led to the emergence and growth of large-scale industrial enterprises, and to a concentration of the bulk of industrial output in the hands of a relatively small number of giant concerns.

These concerns controlling large (and growing) shares of their industries’ output are, as regards what is the principal, or rather the sole purpose of capitalist enterprise, returns on invested capital, in a position that is much more powerful than that of either their small competitive ancestors, or their small competitive contemporar-

ies. Able to gauge the impact of their own business policies on the prices prevailing in their markets, they need not be content with the rates of profit that used to be earned in the competitive markets of old and that are still being earned in the competitive sectors of the present capitalist system. Far from being less single-minded in their pursuit of profits than capitalists used to be in the past—all assertions to the contrary on the part of the now so fashionable apologists of Big Business notwithstanding—the modern monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations find themselves in objective circumstances most favorable to highest returns, and in exploiting these circumstances to the hilt have developed what used to be the art of making a lot of money into what is rapidly becoming a science of long-run profit maximization.

Thus the increase of the productivity of labor (and the mechanism by which it is attained), combined with the mode of apportionment of its fruits as between wages of production workers and profits of capitalists, which is an inherent characteristic of the capitalist system, has a double-pronged effect: the economic surplus generated by the economy tends to become an ever-increasing proportion of aggregate output, and this economic surplus tends to be continually redistributed in favor of a steadily decreasing number of giant capitalist enterprises. If this were the end of the story, the capitalist system would be choking in the flood of economic surplus, for neither capitalists' consumption nor investment in capitalist enterprise would be able singly or jointly to absorb the rising tide. The former is not only physically limited—particularly since the bulk of the surplus accrues to a small number of giant corporations and big stockholders—but runs also counter to the capitalists' basic urge to accumulate. The latter is circumscribed by the profit maximization requirements of monopolistic and oligopolistic business and tends under normal conditions to fall considerably short of the volume of the desired capital accumulation.\* Under such circumstances chronic depression would be capitalism's permanent condition and increasing unemployment its permanent accompaniment.

Yet as most diseases of organic entities call forth some remedial forces so are economic tendencies usually counteracted—at least to some extent—by opposing developments. Both the plethora of surplus and the ascent of monopolistic and oligopolistic enterprise have

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\* This is more fully explained in Chapter III of this writer's *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York, 1957).



drastically changed the nature and strategy of modern business. Price-cutting which during the earlier, competitive phase of capitalism was the principal method by which individual firms sought to maintain and expand their sales, now ranks very low among the strategies of the competitive struggle. Its place has been taken over by tremendously expanded (and expensive) sales organizations, advertising campaigns, public relations programs, lobbying schemes, and by a continuous, relentless effort at product differentiation, model variation, and the invention and promotion of fancier, more elaborate, more sumptuous, and more expensive consumer goods.

But not even the resulting multiplication of waste and the rampant growth of the system's unproductive sector are able to provide sufficient drainage for the overflowing economic surplus. For a large part of the expenses of selling, advertising, model-changing, etc., become necessary costs of doing business under monopoly capitalism and are shifted on to the consumer thus reducing his real income rather than absorbing economic surplus. At the same time an important share of the sizable income accruing to corporate executives, salesmen, admen, public relations experts, market researchers, and fashion designers is saved rather than spent by its recipients and gives rise to what might be called secondary accumulation of capital—another bracket in which the economic surplus makes its statistical appearance.

Nor are other, more or less automatically functioning mechanisms of surplus absorption—capital exports, corporate outlays on research and development, and the like—powerful enough to solve the problem. A conscious effort at utilization of the economic surplus is indispensable if its overflow is to be kept within tolerable limits, if depression and unemployment are not to be allowed to endanger the stability of the capitalist system. Such a conscious effort can only be undertaken by the government. The government in capitalist society is incapable, however, of purposeful employment of the economic surplus for the advancement of human welfare. The powerful capitalist interests by which it is controlled, as well as its social and ideological make-up, render such a policy impossible. Unable to invest in productive enterprise—this would be manifestly in conflict with the dominant interests of monopolistic and oligopolistic business—and barred by the "values" and *mores* of a capitalist society from large-scale spending on welfare objectives (at home and abroad), even a so-called liberal government under monopoly capitalism sees in military spending about the only avenue to salvation, and thus

adds deliberately-organized waste in the government sector to automatically expanding waste in the business sector.

Waste, however, cannot expand smoothly and rapidly. For although the very survival of monopoly capitalism becomes increasingly dependent on squandering of resources and on accelerated preparation for war, *to the individual capitalist enterprise* waste represents a deplorable deduction from surplus to be resisted as strongly as possible. Thus no one firm, not even the largest, can squander more resources than is indicated by the prevailing business practices, so that increases in waste can only develop slowly and gradually, only as all the important firms enlarge their unproductive expenditures and thus set new standards for the economy as a whole. Similarly, the snowballing of governmentally organized waste and skyrocketing military budgets, indispensable as they are to monopoly capitalism, spell to individual Congressmen and Senators nothing but higher taxes or a heavier national debt burden and are permitted only reluctantly and only in an atmosphere of external danger (real or contrived).

Except during wars and their aftermaths, the interaction of all these forces creates a vast potential overflow of the economic surplus which means underproduction, underconsumption, and underinvestment, or—what is the same—underemployment of men, underutilization of productive capacity, and depression. The only remedy for this persistent malaise that is available to monopoly capitalism is further multiplication of waste in both the private and the public sectors of the economic system. The utter irrationality of this “cure” is just as obvious as it is clear that the only *rational* solution is social planning of production and distribution of goods and services. Such social planning is impossible, however, without social ownership of the means of production, without a socialist transformation of society. The *need* for this transformation was never more firmly established than it is now, for never was the gap between society’s potentiality and society’s performance so immense as it is in monopoly capitalism’s present stage. Witnesses to this need are the squalid slums, the poverty and the illiteracy that are the lot of millions of families in the wealthiest country of the world; the moral, cultural, and intellectual decay gripping the entire advanced capitalist world; and—last but not least—the misery of hundreds of millions of people in the underdeveloped countries whose fate could be drastically changed if only a fraction of the resources continually wasted in

the United States were to be used to help overcome their backwardness.

Nor can there be any doubt about the *urgency* of the replacement of monopoly capitalism by socialism. Indeed, every year lost means premature death and immeasurable suffering for millions of people in the entire world. Every year lost increases the mortal danger that capitalism may plunge into the last act of its dialectical drama and seek salvation in a thermonuclear holocaust.

## II

But is not the case for the necessity and urgency of a socialist transformation of the world of monopoly capital nothing but an exercise in rationalism—of no historical relevance in view of the absence of a socialist movement in the United States and its weakness in most other advanced capitalist countries? For it must be clearly realized that the irrationality of a social order leads to a crisis and eventually to a breakdown of that social order only if and when the suffering which it imposes on the masses of the people who have to bear the burden of that irrationality provokes their resistance, arouses their wrath, and results in their determination to replace it by a new, by a better society. It is undoubtedly one of the most important insights of Marxism—an insight that probably more than any other sets Marxism apart from both utopian socialism and bourgeois rationalism—that the comprehension of the existence and nature of the irrationality of a social order, which may be attained by some isolated thinkers at an early stage of the historical process, is merely one, if by no means a negligible, aspect of the crisis of that social order. Comprehension does not become a historical force until and unless the masses' life under the irrational social order becomes intolerable and compels them to add their criticism through practical action to the intellectuals' theoretical criticism—thus raising both to the level of a revolutionary movement.

So we must ask: what if even the most pronounced irrationality of a social order does *not* result in unsupportable suffering of the underlying population, or if the class ruling in society manages successfully to destroy people's awareness of their distress and/or to prevent the understanding of its causes, thus diverting the masses from opposing the existing social order? Marx and Engels—occasional remarks to the contrary notwithstanding—tended on the whole to discount both possibilities. Since it is the very essence of irrationality of a social organization that it inflicts, unnecessarily, pain and priva-

tion upon an underprivileged and exploited population (under capitalism, primarily the urban and rural proletariat), it was considered virtually certain that the life of the working masses would grow increasingly unbearable not necessarily only in the "knife and fork" sense of decreasing real income, but in the more general sense of worsening social existence. At the same time it was seen to be the historical peculiarity of the capitalist system that technological progress and the capitalists' need for literate and disciplined manpower would automatically create conditions for the emergence and development of a labor movement based on the workers' grasping both the causes of their misery and the necessity for the establishment of a more rational social order.

History did not proceed according to these expectations, which reflected the ardent faith in progress of the great century of enlightenment and rationalism. In countries of advanced capitalism such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and others, the two "hitches" just referred to have actually materialized. In these countries the general standard of living has risen considerably and the working population is now in a markedly better condition than it was, say, at the outset of capitalism's current, monopolistic phase. Not that the American, British, or German workers are actually well off. Far from it! Their wages are at best barely sufficient to provide a half-way decent livelihood for themselves and their families; their cultural standards are base and sordid; and their leisure hours are empty and frustrating. Persistent, sometimes receding and sometimes rising, waves of unemployment reduce significantly their skimpy average earnings and produce a perpetual state of indebtedness and job-insecurity. Recurring wars impose heavy blood tolls primarily on the working population.

And yet there has been a significant improvement of the workers' living and working conditions in the course of capitalist development. Since people are generally ignorant of the *potentialities* hidden in any given situation but are vividly aware of the much worse conditions of the past, it is the comparison with what used to be rather than with what could be that determines their attitude toward the present. Nor should it be overlooked that much of the suffering of the working class in a capitalist society affects different individuals with varying intensity. Unemployment, particularly noxious toil, loss of life and limb in wars—all confront people as *personal* disasters, as manifestations of *individual* misfortune rather than as the fate of a class exploited in a pernicious, irrational social order.

But what accounts decisively for the acceptance of the existing social and economic system by the underlying population is a process which is closely related to the developments just mentioned but has nevertheless a dynamic and a significance of its own. It is that the mentality of the dominant class has become undisputedly the dominant mentality, and that the systematically cultivated attitude of taking capitalism for granted, of considering it to be the obvious, the natural order of things, has become not merely the attitude of the bourgeoisie but the attitude of broad popular masses as well. Not that this permeation of society by the ideas, the ethics, and the social and political values of the ruling class represents something new or unexpected. On the contrary, the likelihood or even necessity of this were repeatedly stressed by Marx and Engels as early as the middle of the last century. Yet it would seem that their and other Marxists' view of the role of bourgeois ideology in the historical process needs to be broadened to take account of what has been happening in societies of monopoly capitalism.

In its classical concept, bourgeois ideology appears essentially as a comprehensive world outlook which, reflecting the class interests of the bourgeoisie, prevents society as a whole, but in particular its exploited classes, from understanding the irrationality of the capitalist system, and which, by *justifying* the existing social relations, protects these relations against the aspirations of the masses for whose basic human needs they fail to provide. As can be readily seen, this notion of bourgeois ideology is closely linked to the proposition that the irrationality of the capitalist system cannot but cause persistent (and increasing) suffering and privation to the underlying population. More specifically: while the frustration of basic human needs by the capitalist system was seen as the mainspring of a powerful and potentially overwhelming anti-capitalist movement, religious ideas and those of the sanctity of private property, of law and order, of equality and national interest, were visualized as shields of the capitalist order, as mighty taboos barring the underprivileged and exploited masses from seeking to abolish the exploitation of man by man and to establish a social organization more conducive to the satisfaction of human needs.

What prevents this essentially correct theory from fully coping with the problems presented by monopoly capitalism is that the role of bourgeois ideology has considerably expanded in the course of the last hundred years. In fact, bourgeois ideology was able not only to fulfill the functions discovered and analyzed by Marx and Engels

but also to move on to new, even more ambitious tasks. It no longer serves merely as a brake on people's striving for a better society, it no longer represents merely a barbed wire entanglement keeping people from satisfying their basic needs and potentialities—it has now reached what may be called its ultimate target: it has crippled that striving itself, it has driven a powerful wedge between human *needs* and human *wants*. This "advance" has led to a far-reaching qualitative change of bourgeois thought. As long as the bourgeoisie was a progressive class, its ideology correctly reflected its class interests which, at least partly, were also the interests of society as a whole. This ideology had thus the character of a half-truth. It partook of truth without expressing all of it, it encompassed one aspect of the historical process—the rise of the bourgeoisie—without taking account of the other—the historical limitation and transitory character of the capitalist order. But as the bourgeoisie transformed itself into the ruling class under monopoly capitalism, as its interests have ceased to have anything in common with those of people at home and abroad, bourgeois ideology has "graduated" from being a half-truth to being a total lie. It now expresses merely the interests of the reactionary oligarchy and of its retainers, and even those interests it no longer expresses adequately. Not even the direct beneficiaries of the existing social order feel secure, satisfied, and comfortable under its reign. This can be studied with all the necessary concreteness in the breakdown of the bourgeois family and bourgeois education, in the collapse even of bourgeois moral standards, in the universally recognized vacuity of such principles as free competition, free trade, and equality of opportunity.

While it was thought earlier that people would be incensed by injustice, inequality, and exploitation but would be prevented temporarily from rising against them by fear of divine or civil opprobrium and punishment, under monopoly capitalism they actually do not understand and feel injustice, inequality, and exploitation *as such*, do not *want* to struggle against them but treat them as aspects of the natural order of things. While it used to be thought that bourgeois ideology would guard the existing social order from man's efforts to satisfy basic human needs—decent livelihood, knowledge, solidarity and cooperation with fellowmen, gratification in work and freedom from toil—the actual *wants* of men in the societies of advanced capitalism are determined by aggressive drives, are directed towards the attainment of individual privileges and the exploitation of others, towards frivolous consumption and bar-

ren entertainment. With bourgeois taboos and moral injunctions *internalized*, people steeped in the culture of monopoly capitalism do not want what they need and do not need what they want.

The classical understanding of the function of bourgeois ideology fails to encompass these profound changes for two reasons. In the first place, even Marx and Engels, much as they were aware of the plasticity and moldability of human nature, seriously underestimated the extent to which man's wants can be influenced and shaped by the social order within which he is enclosed. And, collaterally, giving capitalism only a relatively short life, they could not possibly anticipate the scope and the depth of *habit* formation resulting from centuries of capitalist development.

If the above considerations are valid, the societies of the advanced capitalist countries are ill. Just as protracted addiction to alcohol or to narcotics leads sooner or later to disaster, so a prolonged divergence between the *needs* of men and their *wants* cannot but result in catastrophe. The failure of an irrationally organized society to generate internal forces pressing towards and resulting in its abolition and replacement by more rational, more human social relations results necessarily in economic stagnation, cultural decay, and a widespread sense of despondency. Such a society—even if once the most advanced in the world—loses its position of leadership, slides into the backwaters of historical development, and turns into a breeding ground of reaction, inhumanity, and obscurantism.

It would be parochial and myopic, however, to judge the prospects of socialism in the world solely on the basis of the conditions prevailing in the countries of monopoly capitalism. Throughout world history those nations have led in progress in which the irrationality of the social order gave rise to powerful counteracting movements. It was Lenin's genius to have recognized that in the age of monopoly capitalism and imperialism this function of leadership would be taken over by the nations inhabiting the colonial, dependent, and underdeveloped countries. Bearing the brunt of the irrationality of the capitalist system, not having been exposed to the same extent as the advanced capitalist countries to the debilitating and demoralizing impact of capitalist "culture" and bourgeois ideology, some of these nations have already revolted and others are revolting against the irrationality of the capitalist order and now march at the head of history's forward movement. Within an historically short time it will be in these countries that the tone of the world's further development will be set, while the countries of monopoly capital will

first lag behind and then eventually be swayed by the force of example and by the slow but irresistible process of osmosis.

Although it cannot be denied that many aspects of this development, as here sketched, do not correspond to what is usually considered to be Marxian doctrine, nothing would be more fallacious than to conclude from it that they have rendered Marxism an obsolete or a misleading body of thought. Quite on the contrary, it is only with the help of Marxism that the momentous events of our time can be adequately studied and comprehended. What this calls for, however, is not thoughtless regurgitation of particular statements of Marx and Engels—torn out of time and context—but the consistent application of Marx' powerful analytical *method*. But this is a large and important issue which cannot be discussed here. I shall return to it in next month's issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.

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*The appropriation by society of the means of production puts an end not only to the artificial restraints on production which exist today, but also to the positive waste and destruction of productive forces and products which is now the inevitable accompaniment of production. . . . Further, it sets free for society a whole mass of means of production and products by putting an end to the senseless luxury and extravagance of the present ruling class and its political representatives. The possibility of securing for every member of society . . . an existence which is not only fully sufficient from a material standpoint and becoming richer from day to day, but also guarantees to them the completely unrestricted development and exercise of their physical and mental faculties—this possibility now exists for the first time, but it does exist.*

Engels, *Anti-Dühring*



# **WORLD EVENTS**

*By Scott Nearing*

## **The World's BIG THREE Questions**

Crises in the Far East, the Middle East, and North Africa, which upset, alarm, and endanger the West and its way of life, raise three big questions:

(1) Should the citizens of a sovereign country acquire prime real estate beyond their own frontiers?

(2) Should the government of a sovereign country, whose citizens own foreign real estate, declare such holdings a "national interest" and proceed to defend that interest by any and every means, including the dispatch of armed forces?

(3) Can modern man trade, travel, and communicate extensively across frontiers, maintain order and preserve peace without an international authority which will supervise the growing volume of international traffic, anticipate its requirements, plan for them, and take the measures necessary to prevent traffic tangles and major traffic accidents such as those which have brought destruction and death to large parts of the human race during the past four decades?

## **Washington's LITTLE THREE Answers**

Historical, economic, and political developments are driving the United States, its allies, associates, and dependents to formulate three categorical answers to the world's Big Three questions:

(1) They must stop the further spread of communism anywhere in the world. Continuance of the western way of life depends upon the successful implementation of this policy.

(2) They must prevent the spread of communism, peacefully if possible, by argument, by negotiation, by economic and technical aid. Should these peaceful means fail, as they did in China, Indo-China, Korea, and North Africa, they must rely upon armed force. To this end they have ringed the planet with military bases, maintained the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Seventh Fleet in the Far East, and cruising units of the Strategic Air Command always on the move.

(3) Military considerations demand that in the application of armed force the most potent agencies at one's command should be

used—atomic and nuclear weapons, chemicals, bacteria, death rays—whatever can cripple the enemy's will to resistance and bring victory to their side.

### The Wrong Road

We take exception to these Little Three Answers. The problems faced by the people and the government of the United States are not primarily military. They are chiefly economic. They arise, in the first instance, not from any immediate threat of attack, invasion, or military occupation, but out of the attempt of the United States Oligarchy to fulfill President Eisenhower's basic economic precept: "Our economy must continue to expand."

This expansionist precept was the Golden Rule of British, French, German, and Japanese policy through the last century. It was the generally accepted political formula up to and even after the War of 1914-1918. To be sure, the formula was questioned by liberals and denounced by socialists, but it remained the central theme of 19th-century official thinking on public questions.

Domestically, the pursuit of private enterprise expansion led into a boom-bust cycle which still plagues and frustrates private enterprisers the world over. We have written extensively in recent issues of MONTHLY REVIEW on the effect of competitive economic expansion unrestrained by the principles of maximizing efficiency and economy and of minimizing overhead costs. Unplanned and unrestrained economic expansion will lead, sooner or later, to overextension of productive capacity. Where it is accompanied by an expansion of credit, it may result in inflation. Where it is conducted on the spendthrift formula "buy today, pay tomorrow," it will almost certainly end in bankruptcy. United States policy-makers today are wrestling with the undesirable consequence of planless competitive expansion.

Planless competitive economic expansion along the lines now being followed by United States business and government leaders, with the active cooperation of the military, has led in the past and probably will lead in the future into the recession-depression-stagnation which has set back United States economy since the summer of 1957. Arguments on this point have been going on for more than a century. Thus far the history of each epoch, including the one through which we are now passing, helps to confirm the socialist position that recession-depression is the logical and probable consequence of profit accumulation and re-investment.

### Intruders and Invaders

The most deadly consequences of persistent economic expansion are not domestic but international. Unless expansionists can find an uninhabited Robinson Crusoe's land (and so far as we know there is none such), expansion leads into the homelands of other peoples who are called "natives" to distinguish them from the expansionists. Expansion may be for wider markets or investment fields, but it is always against people who got there first—the "natives."

Consequently economic expansion leads to friction, tension, and conflict with the native populations. Expansion and intrusion may seem right and proper at the early hand-shaking and exchange-of-presents stages. Later, however, the staking out of claims, fencing off of corner-lots, hiring native labor for a pittance, and rigging prices so that much native-produced raw material is required to pay for a far less amount of manufactures from the expanding country, lead to serious difficulties.

Ordinarily, in colonial areas, the natives are many; the expansionists few. If matters were put to a vote, the majority against the expansionists would be overwhelming, as it was during the Suez Crisis of 1956. The balance in favor of minority rule against majority opposition and resistance is preserved by sending in the Marines or the Sixth Fleet. From that point forward the conflict between "natives" and expansionist intruders and invaders moves toward an Indonesia, an Indo-China, a Cyprus, or an Algeria.

United States economy has expanded with giant strides since 1946. Increasing quantities of goods and capital have been exported in an effort to maintain the full use of productive capacities. The State Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Defense Department have preceded or accompanied the expansionists, until there is hardly a corner of the planet unencumbered by United States goods, United States dollars, and members of the United States armed forces.

Latin Americans are keenly and bitterly conscious of the consequences of expansion. They learned the lesson from their contacts with the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the British. They learned it equally from the days of free-booting Dollar Diplomacy at the turn of the century.

When the Vice President of the United States went to Latin America in May, 1958, to "look over the property," he was received as intruders and invaders would always be received by "natives" if the scales were evenly balanced. As always, "native" resentment and

resistance was met by alerting the Marines and sending them to the Caribbean.

It is no accident that in "friendly" Taiwan, in embattled Algeria, in bought-and-paid-for Lebanon, and in occupied Latin America, the "natives" answer expansion in the same way—by tearing down flags, gutting buildings, and as a last resort, assaulting the persons of the invaders.

Nowhere on the planet is it possible for outsiders to move into a territory and take over the direction of its economic and political life without arousing native resentment and resistance. Native populations cannot be bought with money nor can they be cowed permanently by tommy guns. Great wealth and powerful military establishments do not enhance the security of the wealthy and powerful. Rather they are an invitation and an incitement to plunder and resistance and rebellion.

### Dead End

There is a second aspect of international economic expansion far more consequential and critical than getting on with the natives. Expansion is not confined to the economy of one nation. There are several expanding economies.

During the four decades from the Franco-Prussian War to the outbreak of general war in 1914, there were six or eight industrial powers, each with an expanding economy. Expansion into territory occupied by more or less unfriendly "natives" involved problems of steadily increasing complexity and difficulty. The real menace faced by each of the expanding economies was not native resistance, however, but the probability that one or several rivals would succeed in gaining a monopoly of the world market for goods and capital. It was the competitive struggle between major powers, with the rising overhead costs of an armament race and the ultimate dislocation and destruction of mechanized warfare, which gutted one economy after another. In 1910 there were half a dozen major European powers with reasonably balanced budgets, stable currencies, and solvent economies. By 1946 all of these economies had passed through various phases of inflation, devaluation, and repudiation of government obligations.

Competitive economic expansion among the major powers has proved to be not merely costly but ruinous. The present situation in France is a good case in point. For a thousand years France has been one of the chief powers in Europe. At times it was the dominant

power. Two centuries of rivalry with Spain, Holland, and Great Britain for the control of colonial territories in the Americas, Asia, and Africa resulted in the establishment of the earth-girdling British Empire, with France in second place. When the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, France was a Great Power, but Britain was *the* Great Power. Through the next hundred years France continued to be the number two power in Europe, with Russia and Germany contending with the French for second place.

France was a victor in the war of 1914-1918. She was defeated and militarily occupied during the 1939-1945 military struggle. Meanwhile, the peoples in her Asian and African colonies and dependencies got out of hand. Since 1946 France has received more than \$11 billion in aid from the United States; yet in the opening months of 1958 French economy was a prey to serious inflation, the currency had been repeatedly devalued, the nation was overburdened with taxes, and the treasury was empty.

France, in 1958, is paying the price of economic expansion, complicated by the unwillingness of "natives" to live peaceably under French rule, and the success of rival powers in outpointing France in their life-and-death struggle for an expanding place in world goods and capital markets.

There is nothing novel in any of these propositions. They have been repeated again and again since Norman Angell published his *Great Illusion* half a century ago. Lenin used the same material in his *Imperialism*, with a quite different emphasis. The propositions are commonplaces of modern statecraft. Yet so effective are the techniques of modern propaganda that government spokesmen can talk of continued economic expansion and of a competitive armament race as though such activities would maintain prosperity and enhance national security.

Persistent economic expansion advocated by the United States Oligarchy and the fast-growing military establishment will lead not to prosperity but to economic bankruptcy and military defeat. History provides overwhelming evidence in favor of these propositions. Contemporary experience affirms them.

### The Capitalist Apple Cart

After the 1914-1918 war, John Maynard Keynes challenged the West with his book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. After the 1939-1945 conflict, Barbara Ward wrote *The West at Bay*. Both books, authored by strong advocates of private-enterprise-for-private-

profit, described the perilous position of the West and argued that unless strong measures were taken, Western economy would disintegrate.

Strong measures were taken in Germany and Japan. But the measures were too strong to be accepted by their fellow advocates of business-for-profit. Both countries were beaten to their knees in the war of 1939-1945. The West continued the policy of periodic crises, improvisation, and policyless drift.

Symbolic of the drift is France, described by sympathetic supporters as the keystone of NATO and the European nucleus of the Western alliance. With French governments rising and falling since 1946 at the rate of one or two a year; with a 19th-century colonial policy which led into corrosive wars in Syria, Indo-China, and North Africa; with persistent budget deficits and a soft currency, France laid the foundation for a fascist dictatorship and followed the familiar path of strong men, with military support, governing by decree.

Political dictatorships do not solve the problems of boom and bust and of colonial unrest and revolt which beset the present-day capitalist world. They do lead to intensified arms races, military adventures, local wars, general wars, and eventually to economic bankruptcy and military defeat.

France, typical bourgeois country of Europe, has been drifting toward the rocks since 1919. The disaster which is overwhelming her and her people should provide a salutary warning to advocates of perpetual economic expansion and high priorities for military establishments.

### Epitaph

Last stronghold of private enterprise economy, shepherding the shattered remnants of 19th-century imperialism, sanctuary of reactionaries from three continents, treasure house of world counter-revolution, the United States, with its ruling Oligarchy of Big Business and military interests, is living beyond its means, plunging deeper and deeper into debt, and financing its mad escapade with IOU's. Harried by debt and surrounded by enemies who are Communists and allies who are anti-American, the self-proclaimed Leader of the Free World seems likely to end its career under a headstone bearing the inscription: Here lies a spendthrift and bomb-toting madman who perished with this obscurity on his lips: "Buy! Buy now! Buy something! Buy anything!"

(continued from inside front cover)

which embodies the findings of an extended stay in China in the summer and autumn of 1957. The authors were in China at the same time and were able to coordinate their researches on the spot. The tract brings Adler's book up to date and contains extraordinarily interesting new material on China's recently launched campaign to bring the nation's rate of population growth under control. In a Foreword, Harold Wilson—who is slated to hold an important post in the next British Labor government—says: "This Fabian study by Joan Robinson and Sol Adler brings before the reader the clearest and most succinct compilation of facts and value judgments about China's economic development which is so far available." We have entered a bulk order for *China: An Economic Perspective* and can supply it to MR readers at the same price as the Formosa issue of MR—35 cents a copy, three for a dollar.

Shortly after the September issue reached subscribers, we received a letter from a professor at a large university saying in part: "It has too long become in the United States a most rare intellectual delight to read such a magazine article as 'American Policy in the Middle East' which appears in your September 1958 issue." Our correspondent concludes, "I hope you get more readers in the United States of America." To those of you who share this hope, let us call attention again to the finding of last year's survey of MR's readership which showed that by far the most effective salesmen the magazine has are its present subscribers. There seems to be nothing we can do in the way of promotion and advertising which compares in effectiveness with what you can do by the simple method of urging your friends and acquaintances to become fellow subscribers. Don't forget that we will be glad to send free sample copies to any addresses you may provide.

Announcements: (1) Scott Nearing will speak in Washington, D. C., on November 3rd at 11 p.m. over radio station WWDC; and on November 4th at 7:45 p.m. at All States Hotel Hall, 514 19th Street, N.W., on the subject "Can the West Reconquer Asia?" (2) Anna Melissa Graves of 1509 Park Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, would like to hear from MR readers in the Baltimore area.

If you are a subscriber, before this issue reaches you you will have received the annual Monthly Review Associates appeal. There is nothing we need add to it here except to say that we hope you will respond generously and promptly to Chairman J. Raymond Walsh's eloquent letter. If you buy your copies of the magazine on the newsstands, however, you will not get the appeal, much as we wish it were possible to send it to you. Let us assure you, therefore, on behalf of Dr. Walsh and the whole Associates' board that you are cordially invited to join and thereby help Monthly Review to live and grow. Contributing Associates pay from \$8 to \$14, Supporting Associates from \$15 to \$49, Sustaining Associates from \$50 to \$99, and Foundation Associates \$100 or more. All Associates automatically receive (1) a year's subscription to the magazine, (2) all MR pamphlets, and (3) free admission to all MR Associates lectures. Those who contribute \$15 or more receive in addition, free of charge, a copy of Anne Braden's *The Wall Between* or any other MR Press book of their choice.

Those who have read and learned from Scott Nearing's books in the past will be glad to know that on November 15th Scott and Helen will publish their latest book, *The Brave New World*, an account of their last year's trip to the Soviet Union and China. For details, see the back cover of this issue. And please note that orders should be sent not to MR but to the Social Science Institute, Harborside, Maine.

*Publication Date: November 15, 1958*

# THE BRAVE NEW WORLD

by **HELEN & SCOTT NEARING**

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